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Abstract
This paper explores the role of social integration on inequity concerns.
Using a three-phase experimental protocol we rst elicit a social network
from a group of undergraduate students in Economics; in the second phase,
169 of these subjects have to assign a xed amount of money to only one
of two individuals and, then, in the third stage they decide how much
they are willing to pay to "repair" the created inequality. Our experi-
mental data indicate that standard measures of network theory, such as
betweenness, out-degree and reciprocal degree, have a positive e¤ect on
inequity concerns. These results suggest that (1) pro-sociality and social
networks coevolve and (2) information on the social network structure, in
which subjects are embedded is important to account for their behavior.
1 Motivation
It is well documented that humans tend to behave cooperatively towards other
unknown individuals. It has been observed though that the level of social con-
cern itself depends on several factors. Some of these factors a¤ecting the level
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of unselshness, such as repeated interaction, reputation and strong reciprocity
among others, are now well understood (Fehr and Camerer (2006), Fehr and
Fischbacher (2003), Fehr and Gachter (2002), Rabin (1993)). However, there
remains a level of cooperation that apparently cannot be explained by any of
these variables.
This paper adds a new dimension to this discussion by exploring the role of
social integration on inequity concerns (Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000)). Recently, a number of experiments have focused on several
social aspects, such as the degree of anonymity among experimental subjects
and between subjects and the experimenter, mainly in the framework of Dic-
tator and Ultimatum Games (Bohnet and Frey (1999), Brañas-Garza (2006),
Burnham (2003), Charness and Gneezy (forthcoming)). This literature unam-
biguously shows that the smaller the (social) distance between the parties in-
volved, the larger the social concern. This evidence notwithstanding, to the best
of our knowledge little attention has been paid to social network relationships
to explain the pro-social behavior.1
Brañas-Garza et al. (2006a) explore whether the social network in which
experimental subjects are embedded, is related to their attitude to give. They
report that, on average, more central (i.e. highly integrated within the network)
players give more in a classic experimental protocol of the Dictator Game. Thus,
they provide evidence that the pure altruism of an individual is positively related
with her centrality in the network measured by betweenness, although their
results concerning other measures of centrality are not conclusive.
To provide a (statistically) stronger evidence, we analyze in a larger sample
the relationship between the social network position of individuals, measured by
three classic measures of network theory, and their inequity concerns. The ex-
perimental evidence suggests that network centrality enhances inequity aversion.
Moreover, we nd a positive relation between the revealed inequity aversion and
both the number of stated and reciprocated links. These relations between the
network position and inequity concerns are highly signicant.
2 Experimental Design
We use the experimental data in Brañas-Garza et al. (2005), who study inequity
concerns in di¤erent situations. Their experiment was conducted at the Univer-
sity of Granada (Spain) in May 2005. Subjects were rst-year undergraduate
students in Economics. The possibility to participate in an experiment was an-
nounced in class to rst year students. Since a list of friends for each subject
was needed, it was more likely to nd it within the same class. However, par-
ticipation was voluntary. Students wishing to participate were invited to go to
1Notable exceptions are Mobius et al. (2004) and Goeree et al. (2006). See Brañas-Garza
and Espinosa (2006) for a review. There is also a stream of evolutionary literature that shows
that spatial structures may enhance the proliferation of unselsh behavior (Nowak (2006),
Fosco and Mengel (2007) and Marsilli et al. (2004)). Nevertheless, this literature does not
provide any evidence that unselshness and social networks coevolve.
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a nearby room. The data contain both social network position and a measure
of inequity concern from 169 individuals.
The experiment was run in three stages: In the rst phase, a Benet-your-
FriendIncentive Device for Network Elicitation was used to elicit the (directed)
social network.2 The protocol for network elicitation was extremely simple:
subjects were asked to write down on a piece of paper the name of their classmate
friends who may have the chance to be beneted later in the experiment.
Since they aimed the subjects to reveal the identity of their closest friends, the
instructions clearly stated that they might be given the chance to benet only
one of the friends, randomly chosen from their list, so that the more friends they
had listed, the lower the chance of beneting any particular individual. Despite
its simplicity, they obtained an average of 50.1% of corresponded links, which is
a very accurate mapping of social correspondences when compared with more
sophisticated protocols used for analogous purposes (Mobius et al. (2004)).3
In the second phase subjects had to decide the assignment of 10 units of
experimental currency (EC) to one of two subjects.4 The purpose of this stage
is to create an inequality, since one of the two recipients gets 10 EC, while the
other gets nothing. In one treatment condition, the deciding player is one of
the two recipients. Thus, this treatment has a feature of the Dictator Game,
where a player decides the distribution of payo¤s between herself and another
player. The di¤erence with respect to the traditional Dictator Game is that she
can either keep all for herself or give the whole amount to the other player.5
In the second treatment, the deciding player is not a recipient; she decides the
assignment to one of two individuals, again giving the whole amount to one of
them, but her payo¤ is not involved. In each of the two conditions, there were
two frames: stranger and friend. The other player(s) is (are) either a randomly
assigned stranger(s) (individual(s) that she had not listed in the rst phase) or
a randomly assigned friend(s) from her stated links.6 This creates a 2  2 = 4
factorial design. Table 1 shows the number of observations in each treatment.
Insert Table 1 around here.
To deal with the treatment di¤erences, in the treatment where the deciding
2See Brañas et al. (2007) for a discussion of network elicitation mechanisms.
3Part of the noncorresponded links were due to the fact that some students in the class
list were absent and could not correspond.
4The experimental currency were classpoints that served to increase the nal grade in the
Microeconomics course. This experiment was the rst out of four di¤erent experiments and
the payo¤ system was as follows: The best performing subject in the four experiments earned
3 points in grade out of 10. In other words, the winner earned 30% of the nal grade of the
course. The remaining subjects earnings depend on how close their performance is to the
winner. Each of the four experiments weighed equally in the nal count. Thus, the winner
could have earned 7:5% of the nal grade of the course by the perfomance in this experiment.
5This game can be consider as a Dictator Game in which players take a binary decision,
(10,0) or (0,10).
6More precisely, in the treatment where the subject decides whether to keep 10 EC for
herself or give it to someone else, friend (stranger) frame means that the other person is (not)
her friend. When deciding the assignment between two other individuals, friend (stranger)
frame means that both are friends (strangers).
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agents payo¤s are not involved in the game, she received a show-up fee of 10
EC to be used in the second stage, as described below, for the reduction of the
created inequity. This design feature ensures that all deciding subjects have 10
EC at the beginning of the following stage.7
Third stage served to extract individualsattitudes towards inequity. After
taking their decisions in the previous phase, subjects are given the possibility
to reduce the created inequity. They have to state how much they were willing
to pay for the person that has not been given anything to receive 10 EC as
well. The decision was taken using a payment card. Subjects faced ten di¤erent
situations with the following structure:
I am willing to pay 1 EC in order to give the other player
the opportunity of obtaining 10 EC
I am willing to pay 2 EC in order to give the other player
the opportunity of obtaining 10 EC
...
I am willing to pay 10 EC in order to give the other player
the opportunity of obtaining 10 EC
Subjectstask in this stage was only to mark the options individuals are willing
to accept. Only one of their decision randomly selected would be implemented.8
Since the amount subjects are willing to pay reects how much subjects value
equity, this serves as a measure of individual inequity aversion. Subjects did
not know in advance they would face this decision.
3 The Analysis
To obtain the inequity concerns of individuals we used data from the four treat-
ments. Thus, as a rst step, we need to homogenize the measures of inequity
aversion. For each i, we construct the following measure of inequity concerns:
ineqi = wtpi  dwtpi
where wtpi is i s willingness-to-pay to reduce the created inequality, as described
in previous section, and dwtpi is the median willingness-to-pay of the treatment
i participates in. Observe that the subtraction of the corresponding medians
gets rid of the possible treatment di¤erences. With this variable in hand, we
can pool all the observations into one dataset. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of the constructed variable.
Insert Figure 1 around here.
7Note that deciding subjects, whose payo¤s were involved in the decision, have not received
the show-up fee. Thus, individuals, who gave the whole amount to their partners, did not
have the opportunity to reduce the created inequality and are excluded from the analysis of
this paper.
8This information was known to all participants in the experiment.
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The majority of subjects are as inequity concerned as the median of their
group and the distribution roughly resembles normal distribution.
We apply standard measures in network theory to test our working hypoth-
esis that individuals inequity concerns are (positively) correlated with their
social integration. Among the classic measures provided by the literature, we
focus on three of them, betweenness centrality, out-degree, and reciprocal degree.
Loosely speaking, betweenness centrality of individual i measures the number
of shortest paths through i between any pair of subjects. Hence, betweenness
is an index which measures centrality of individual i through the impact on the
connection structure if i were removed from the network. Another measure of
centrality is out-degree, which measures the number of stated links of individual
i. Thus, out-degree is the level of individualssubjective popularity in the net-
work. A third measure is reciprocal degree, the number of bidirectional links.
In terms of our experiment, reciprocal degree is the number of a subjectfriends
who listed him as a friend. Table 2 summarizes these measures in our data.9
Insert Table 2 around here.
Table 3 explores the e¤ect of the discussed measures of social integration on
revealed inequity concerns. We estimate a standard ordered Logit regression,
in which the probability of any possible level of inequity concern is regressed
against one of the discussed measures of social integration, and gender.10 The
p-values of the estimated coe¢ cients suggest that social integration matters in
explaining the inequity concerns of individuals. The e¤ects are positive and
signicant at 5% level. The estimations lead to the following conclusions:
 Betweenness has a positive e¤ect on the level of inequity. Moreover, the
e¤ect is statistically very strong (p = 0:010).
 The estimate of perceived popularity, measured by out-degree, suggests a
positive, statistically highly signicant impact (the odd ratio is 1:335 and
p = 0:003).
 The reciprocal degree a¤ects the inequity concerns as much as out-degree
(odd ratio is equal to 1:260), but the relation is less signicant (p = 0:047),
even though still signicant at 5%.
In sum, the regression analysis provides evidence that individuals who are
more socially integrated in their social network tend to be more inequity con-
cerned with respect to the median behavior.
9We also estimated the e¤ect of degree and in-degree. Degree abstracts from the direction
of the links. This measure also has a signicant positive e¤ect. In-degree of individual i is
interesting in that it is an outcome of decisions of other individuals. The estimated e¤ect
conrms the positive relation between social integration and inequity concerns, but is not
signicant on traditional 5%.
10We observe no gender e¤ect in the regressions.
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4 Discussion
This paper explores a new aspect on the determinants of pro-social behavior:
social integration. Most of previous experimental literature has focused on eco-
nomic incentives, reputation e¤ects, framing or between-subject relations, and
these factors have been shown to be important for pro-social behavior. The
puzzle is that, even when all these factors have been accounted for, there is still
some human cooperation that remains unexplained. Some work has pointed to
socialization and cultural transmission of social values as a solution to this puz-
zle. There is experimental evidence with children, showing that younger children
are less generous/cooperative in the Dictator/Public Good Games (Harbough
et al. (2003), Kraus and Harbaugh (2000)). These results could be due to the
fact that older children are more advanced in their socialization process and as
a consequence, they show a more pro-social behavior. Along these lines, our
research explores the idea that social integration may also be an important de-
terminant for inequity concerns. Note that this hypothesis is consistent with
the evidence on children playing the Dictator Game since older children also
have, on average, a higher level of social capital. However, since socialization
and transmission of values is a more complex process, rather than just social
capital accumulation, we test our hypothesis with subjects at the same stage of
the socialization process but, nonetheless, with di¤erent positions in their social
network. In line with these arguments, in our data social integration is related
to inequity concerns.
Our results unambiguously show that the social network architecture has to
be included within the list of determinants of human behavior. Social structure
and human prosociality, represented by inequity concerns in our study, indeed
coevolve as suggested by evolutionary literature.
On the other hand, our data does not provide an answer to an important
question: Are subjects (on average) more inequity concerned because they are
pivotal and well connected in their social network, or rather they are socially
integrated precisely because they show (for whatever reason) a more socially
concerned attitude toward the rest of the group?11 To answer this question,
a more detailed investigation on which (demographic, social or psychological)
characteristics are correlated with our network measures would be useful.
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stranger friend Total
player involved 28 27 55
player not involved 64 50 114
Total 92 77 169
Table 1. Number of observations per treatment.
Figure 1. Histogram of the variable ineq.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
betweenness 169 574.08 1011.47 0 6224.62
out  degree 169 2.19 1.46 0 6
reciprocal 169 1.27 1.17 0 5
Table 2. Summary of measures of social integration.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
betweenness
:0003373
(:0001312)
- -
out  degree - :2891732

(:0965542)
-
reciprocal - -
:2310941
(:1161662)
female
 :370347
(:2787557)
 :3957274
(:2827263)
 :3379402
(:2813517)
N 169 167 167
Wald 22 7.33 10.00 4.86
P > 22 .0256 .0067 .0882
Pseudo R2 .011 .0152 .0074
Signicance level:  1%,  5%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3. Estimation Results.
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